IP Address: 119.126.157.64Previously Malicious
IP Address: 119.126.157.64Previously Malicious
This IP address attempted an attack on a machine in our threat sensors network
Role |
Attacker, Scanner |
Services Targeted |
RDP |
Tags |
Execute from Share RDP RDP Brute Force Known Malware Port 3389 Scan Service Start System Shutdown Post Reboot Rename Service Creation Successful RDP Login Service Stop Service Configuration Unhandled Exception Persistency - Logon Download and Execute System File Modification DNS Query Morto Service Deletion Access Suspicious Domain Access Share |
Associated Attack Servers |
- |
IP Address |
119.126.157.64 |
|
Domain |
- |
|
ISP |
China Telecom Guangdong |
|
Country |
China |
|
WHOIS |
Created Date |
- |
Updated Date |
- |
|
Organization |
- |
First seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation |
2020-04-28 |
Last seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation |
2020-05-12 |
What is Akamai Guardicore SegmentationAkamai Guardicore Segmentation is a data center and cloud security solution that protects the organization's core assets, using flexible, quickly deployed and easy to understand micro-segmentation controls. Akamai Guardicore Segmentation generates in-context security incidents, with details on attacker tools and techniques, that help IR teams prioritize incident investigation and reduce dwell time. Learn More
A user logged in using RDP with the following credentials: administrator / ******** - Authentication policy: Correct Password (Part of a Brute Force Attempt) |
RDP Brute Force Successful RDP Login |
a.dll was loaded from the remote share \\tsclient\a by c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe |
Execute from Share |
c:\windows\regedit.exe installed and started c:\windows\temp\ntshrui.dll as a service named Ias under service group netsvcs |
Service Start Service Creation |
The file C:\WINDOWS\Temp\ntshrui.dll was downloaded and loaded by c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe |
Download and Execute |
Process netsvcs Service Group attempted to access suspicious domains: dos1.jifr.net, flt1.jifr.net, ms.jifr.co.be, ms.jifr.info, ms.jifr.net and ss.jifr.net |
DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain |
Service Ias was stopped |
Service Stop |
System file c:\windows\clb.dllbak was modified 25 times |
System File Modification |
c:\windows\regedit.exe installed c:\windows\system32\sens32.dll as a service named SENS under service group netsvcs |
Service Creation |
c:\windows\offline web pages\cache.txt was renamed to c:\windows\system32\sens32.dll by c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe ( pending reboot ) |
Post Reboot Rename |
c:\progra~1\common~1\micros~1\dw\dw20.exe set the command line "c:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\DW\dwtrig20.exe" -t to run using Persistency - Logon |
Persistency - Logon |
Process netsvcs Service Group attempted to access domains: ms.jifr.co.cc |
DNS Query |
Process netsvcs Service Group generated outgoing network traffic to: 192.168.8.10:3389, 192.168.8.11:3389, 192.168.8.12:3389, 192.168.8.13:3389, 192.168.8.14:3389, 192.168.8.15:3389, 192.168.8.16:3389, 192.168.8.17:3389, 192.168.8.18:3389, 192.168.8.19:3389, 192.168.8.1:3389, 192.168.8.20:3389, 192.168.8.21:3389, 192.168.8.22:3389, 192.168.8.23:3389, 192.168.8.24:3389, 192.168.8.25:3389, 192.168.8.26:3389, 192.168.8.2:3389, 192.168.8.3:3389, 192.168.8.4:3389, 192.168.8.5:3389, 192.168.8.6:3389, 192.168.8.7:3389, 192.168.8.8:3389, 192.168.8.9:3389 and 74.125.71.104:80 |
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c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe attempted shutdown of type Shut down all processes running in the logon session of the process with reason: Unspecified |
System Shutdown |
Process netsvcs Service Group scanned port 3389 on 26 IP Addresses |
Port 3389 Scan |
Connection was closed due to user inactivity |
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